Social choice theory with collectively qualified agendas: The case where there exist voting agenda setters

Yukinori Iwata[*]

November 12, 2012

Abstract

In a recent paper, Iwata (2011) proposes a model to introduce the process of agenda formation in social choice theory. The model considers a two-stage procedure where a subset of potentially feasible alternatives is collectively qualified by aggregating agenda setters' opinions, and a subset of qualified alternatives is socially chosen by aggregating voters' preferences. We extend the proposed framework to the case where there exist voting agenda setters who always prefer positive alternatives, to neutral ones, and to negative ones in terms of their own opinion. When each voting agenda setter has such a preference space, we first characterize Arrow-consistent preference domains on which a social choice correspondence with the set of qualified alternatives. Furthermore, we consider a family of social choice correspondences with the set of qualified alternatives and provide Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in this framework.

JEL classification: D71, D72

Keywords: agenda formation, qualification functions, voting agenda setters, Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

[*]Faculty of International Politics and Economics, Nishogakusha University: y-iwata@nishogakusha-u.ac.jp