

A decomposition of strategy-proofness

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Abstract

Strategy-proofness has been one of the central axioms in the theory of social choice. We find that *strategy-proofness* is decomposed into three axioms: *top-restricted AM-proofness*, *weak monotonicity*, and *individual bounded response*. We present possibility results by excluding *individual bounded response* from *strategy-proofness*. One of the results supports the plurality rule which is the most widely used rule in practice.

Keywords: individual bounded response, nonmanipulability, strategy-proofness, top-restricted AM-proofness, weak monotonicity

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