

Interim Equilibrium Implementation *

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Abstract

A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solution concept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adopt interim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent's interim beliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept and investigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incomplete information environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditions under which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doing so, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation and Nash implementation.

JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.

Keywords: closure, convex range property, implementation, interim equilibrium, interim incentive compatibility, interim equilibrium monotonicity, intersection property, no-worst-rule condition, social choice set.