Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium [*]

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Summary. We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided.

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